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I. INTRODUCTION
By the late 1980s, the Third World debt crisis threatened the stabil-
ity and solvency of major international financial institutions. In particu-
lar, it endangered the profitability of the transnational banks that
intermediated a large share of world capital flows. In response, the banks
looked to their governments to act both individually and through multi-
lateral institutions, notably the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The banks hoped for a two-pronged response. First, they called for in-
creased official lending to debtor nations to underwrite a portion of the
bank loans. Second, they endorsed their governments' efforts to ensure
that Third World countries repaid foreign debt through "austerity" pro-
grams, no matter what the domestic cost. Given the budget constraints
on Western states, changes in policy in the Third World seemed increas-
ingly urgent to the banks.
Austerity policies aimed to free up resources both to repay creditors
and to invest for future economic growth. To that end, they sought to
cut government spending and real wages. The austerity policies func-
tioned primarily by allowing free-market mechanisms to replace the ad-
ministrative distribution of goods and services. In effect, however, these
policies failed to satisfy either domestic or foreign requirements. In most
cases they could not stimulate domestic investment. Instead, in many
Third World nations, they brought about deep recessions by throttling
local demand. Austerity policies also generated political and social
resistance, ultimately, compelling cuts in payments on debt.
The failures of the austerity packages follow from their inappropri-
ate use of economic theory and political myopia. For an economic analy-
sis, the austerity approach adopts a supply-side position based on a
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simplistic reading of neo-classical economics, with little, if any, research
into the peculiarities of the Third World or individual countries. In es-
sence, the programs assume Third World economies resemble perfectly
competitive markets. According to this reasoning, government interven-
tion in economic decision making represents the main obstacle to efficient
resource use.
In reality Third World markets diverge radically from the ideal, no-
tably in their massive income inequalities, concentration of economic
power, modified profit motivation, factor immobility, and imperfect in-
formation. In such conditions, free-market solutions frequently generate
pervasive inefficiency, slower growth, and a deteriorating ability to meet
debt payments. In political terms, at least in the short run, austerity
programs explicitly seek to release funds to reimburse foreign creditors
by cutting the consumption of the poor majority, particularly in the ur-
ban areas. Necessarily, that approach brings about resistance, and ulti-
mately the demise of most austerity policies.
Instead of advocating austerity, foreign 'creditors could profitably
seek less doctrinaire solutions to Third World debt by taking into ac-
count the specifics of individual countries. In order to achieve the eco-
nomic growth needed to repay debt in the long run, Third World
countries cannot continue to endure a net loss of resources to Western
lenders. Nor can they hope for long-term growth without redistribution
that shifts resources to more efficient producers and enhances social and
political coherence. If creditors showed greater leniency in the medium
term and permitted appropriate changes in economic structure, in the
long run Third World countries could probably repay more of their debt.
Eventually they might become profitable borrowers again.
This comparatively lenient approach would parallel the strategy fre-
quently adopted toward large borrowers in the domestic economy. In
such cases, rather than forcing companies into bankruptcy, the govern-
ment and creditors often provide bridging loans. Freed of the pressure of
immediate repayment, management can undertake the reorganization
needed to return to profitability.1
This Article explores the impact of austerity programs. First, it out-
lines the dimensions and impact of Third World debt in general. It then
considers the theoretical analysis underlying austerity programs, Fi-
nally, it suggests policies that, in the long run, could prove of greater
benefit to both lenders and borrowers.
1. See R. REICHER & J. DONAHUE, NEw DEALS (1985).
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II. THE COSTS OF THIRD WORLD DEBT
The actual and potential costs and benefits of Third World debt do
not appear from consideration of its extent alone. In the late 1980s,
Third World debt reached approximately one trillion dollars.2 That fig-
ure suggests its potential for disrupting financial relationships, but does
not reveal who, in the end, would pay it: Third World workers, peasants
or ruling groups, Western banks or governments. Different economic ac-
tors assessed the extent of the debt differently in terms of their own real
or potential cost; each group preferred to deal with debt in ways that
ameliorated its own problems, even if that placed greater burdens on
others.
The costs of Third World debt, then, do not emerge in the abstract,
but only as they affect particular social groups. As always with credit,
the question of who will ultimately pay remains an area of speculation
and conflict. After exploring that question in the next section, this Arti-
cle considers the costs of Third World debt to two major actors: the
transnational banks and Third World economies.
A. Factors Affecting the Costs of Default and Repayment
Theoretically, by lending money rather than investing directly, fin-
anciers accept lower returns (in the form of interest) in exchange for re-
duced risks. Loan contracts generally ensure that borrowers bear most
investment risks, since they must seek to repay creditors even if they
make no profit themselves. From the 1970s, the frequent use of a floating
interest rate on international markets further protected lenders. These
agreements set the interest to the borrower a few points above the cost of
money to the lender. They effectively made debtors assume, not only
investment risks, but also the costs of financial intermediation. In the
mid-1980s, loans at floating interest accounted for some two-fifths of all
Third World borrowing.'
Lenders have three instruments to compel repayment. In interna-
tional finance, the transnational banks applied all three to the national
economies of the Third World. First, even before providing loans, credi-
tors can demand operational changes designed to enhance profits and the
potential for repayment. Second, they can attempt to ensure that de-
2. Different authorities give different figures. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
(IMF), WORLD ECON. OUTLOOK, Apr. 1, 1988, at 174, table A46 [hereinafter IMF, April
1988; INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT (IBRD), I
WORLD DEBT TABLES 2 (1988-89) [hereinafter TABLES].
3. Calculated from TABLES, supra note 2, at 3.
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faulting debtors have no access to credit from anyone in the future - a
serious threat, since modem economies in general and international trade
in particular depend on credit. Finally, creditors involve the state by
writing legal sanctions for default into the loan contract. Capitalist gov-
ernments -that do not enforce such contracts risk a loss of legitimacy, at
least among investors. In the halcyon days of the mid-1970s, most trans-
national banks argued that these instruments would stop foreign govern-
ments from defaulting. But the vagaries of international markets in the
1980s buffeted their assurance. Above all, the banks found that in the
absence of an international legal code, Third World debtors faced few
legal sanctions for default.' The decision whether or not to meet debt
charges became less a legal or moral matter than a question of net eco-
nomic and political cost. Third World debtors had to weigh the punish-
ment for default against the difficulties caused by cutting domestic
consumption and investment in order to repay debt.
In the class-ridden societies of the Third World, the costs and bene-
fits associated with the repayment equation had a widely divergent im-
pact on different social groups - workers, peasants, employers, leading
civil servants, and politicians. Each class came to a unique conclusion
about the costs and benefits of loan repayment. Major conflicts over pol-
icy ensued.
If Third World debtors decided not to repay their loans, their credi-
tors must absorb the costs. Typically, private lenders in the West sought
government support in bearing these losses. Primarily, they tried to get
their governments and multilateral organizations to lend to Third World
states, which in turn used the borrowed funds to repay their earlier credi-
tors. If Western governments assume the costs of Third World debt, the
impact depends on whose income that policy ultimately affects, whether
in current or opportunity terms - taxpayers, individual recipients of
government spending or particular economic sectors.
B. The Costs of Third World Debt
For the transnational banks, the potential harm of Third World debt
emerges from the size of these loans relative to their overall assets and
international financial markets in general. In this context, the concentra-
tion of private debt on a few nations and a handful of major banks from
each Western country greatly enhances the lenders' risks. The rising
share of official lending in Third World credit reflects the efforts of West-
ern governments to reduce those dangers.
4. See, e.g., J. LOXLEY, DEBT AND DISORDER 71 (1986).
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With differences existing between various authorities,' aggregate
data on Third World debt remains notoriously unreliable. The IMF ex-
pects total Third World debt to reach 1.3 trillion dollars in 1989.6
According to the World Bank, between 1974 and 1982 international
lending to the Third World multiplied four times in nominal terms and
doubled in real terms.7 Between 1982 and 1989, however, it declined in
real terms, because private institutions recognizing the growing risks of
lending to the Third World have developed new markets in the United
States and elsewhere.8 In 1980 and 1981, private lenders supplied almost
eighty billion dollars a year to the Third World. Between 1982 and 1985,
the annual flow dropped to one-third that amount, and between 1986 and
1989, new loans had fallen to well under ten billion dollars a year.9 Pri-
vate lending to the Third World rose under three percent a year in the
late 1980s, well under the international rate of inflation.' 0
While the Third World as a whole appeared a poor risk, the enor-
mous variations in the debt burden of different countries ensured that
only a handful could threaten the livelihood of major financial institu-
tions. The assets of the transnational banks that managed most interna-
tional loans typically exceeded one hundred billion dollars by the late
1980s. They could suffer seriously from a default by the eight leading
debtors - Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Poland, India, Indonesia, South
Korea, and Venezuela" - whose government and government-guaran-
teed debts in the mid-1980s came to over twenty-five billion dollars
apiece. As a group, these countries accounted for approximately one-
half of all Third World debt.12 The two largest debtors, Brazil and Mex-
ico, with official debts over one hundred billion dollars each by 1988,11
accounted for one-fifth of all Third World debt."4 By contrast, most
Third World countries could hardly threaten the giant banks. Their re-
5. See supra note 2.
6. IMF, WORLD ECON. OUTLOOK, Oct. 1988, at 122, table A46 [hereinafter IMF, Oct.
1988.
7. IBRD, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1988, at 27 (OUP, 1988) [hereinafter RE-
PORT 1988].
8. Id. at 29; TABLES, supra note 2, at xxiv.
9. Calculated from IMF, Oct. 1988, supra note 6, at 108, table A40. In 1988, net private
lending to the Third World came to negative 9.6 billion dollars, but it rose to 7.6 billion dollars
for 1989. Id.
10. Calculated from id. at 123, table A47.
11. REPORT 1988, supra note 7, at 258, table 19, in order of size using World Bank
figures.
12. Calculated from id.
13. TABLES, supra note 2, at xviii, box 1.
14. Id.
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ported liabilities averaged under five billion dollars apiece, too little for a
national default to endanger any one transnational bank.15
The largest debtors also represented a greater danger for private in-
stitutions because they relied less on bank loans rather than credits from
foreign governments. Even in the late 1980s, international financial mar-
kets provided between almost three-quarters of the total debt of the fif-
teen middle-income countries that the World Bank labelled "heavily
indebted." 16 By contrast, for the lower income countries, lending by for-
eign states and multilateral organizations accounted for almost all for-
eign debt, particularly after 1982. For the low income countries of sub-
Saharan Africa, private creditors provided only around one-eighth of to-
tal loans in 1987, down from around one-quarter ten years earlier. One-
third of these private funds represented suppliers' credits rather than
bank loans. 7
The dominance of a few financial institutions on international mar-
kets complemented the concentration of Third World debt on a handful
of countries. For each Western country, well under ten major banks
managed most international lending, although a number of regional
banks participated to a lesser extent.' In the early 1980s, the top trans-
national banks from the United States loaned the equivalent of one-third
to two-thirds of their capital to heavily indebted countries such as Mex-
ico and Brazil. 9
While the transnational banks, their governments, the IMF, and the
World Bank worried about the threat to international markets, most
Third World governments focused on the debt's impact on individual
economies. Their import dependence made the foreign-exchange cost of
debt payments and the resulting squeeze on foreign purchases particu-
larly important. Countries that used over thirty percent of their export
revenues to meet debt-service charges (interest plus capital payments)
typically endured severe economic and political difficulties.
The standard index used to illustrate the effect of foreign debt on
national economies, the debt-service ratio, relates debt service on me-
dium- and long-term debt to export revenues. For the Third World as a
whole, this ratio rose from one-tenth to one-fifth between 1970 and
1986.20 For individual countries, however, the figure varied widely and
15. Calculated from id.
16. Calculated from, IMF, Oct. 1988, supra note 6, at 126, table A48.
17. Calculated from TABLES, supra note 2, at 34.
18. See J. LOXLEY, supra note 4, at 68.
19. Calculated from id. at 66, table 3.7.
20. REPORT 1988, supra note 7, at 259, table 19.
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bore little relationship to its international importance. Almost one-third
of the developing world, or thirty-one countries, reported debt-service
ratios of over twenty percent. They included only five of the eight largest
debtors - the Latin American countries plus Indonesia. The three other
leading debtors (India, Poland, and South Korea) had much lower debt-
service ratios. On average, the remaining countries with dangerously
high debt-service ratios owed less than ten billion dollars apiece.2 A
number of sub-Saharan African countries endured crippling debt-service
ratios of up to sixty percent; yet their debts averaged well under five bil-
lion dollars each, with less than one-fifth due private lenders.
After 1982, for many developing countries, the banks' reluctance to
maintain lending combined with rising debt-service payments to generate
a net transfer of funds to Western creditors. Between 1982 and 1987, the
Third World's net loss on all loans came to some eighty-five billion dol-
lars.' On private credit alone, the net loss totalled over fifty billion dol-
lars.23 In 1987, the lowest-income country in the world, Ethiopia, paid
over three percent of its national product in debt service.24
The loss of resources had a devastating impact on growth in the
more indebted countries. In the seventeen "highly indebted" middle-in-
come countries, investment and imports fell over five percent a year be-
tween 1980 and 1987, while per capita consumption contracted almost
two percent a year. In the twenty-two heavily indebted countries of sub-
Saharan Africa, most of which fell into the low-income group, both in-
vestment and per capita consumption dropped about three percent per
year between 1982 and 1986.25 As the World Bank noted, "[t]he debt
crisis of the 1980s thus dealt a double blow to the more vulnerable devel-
oping countries. Reductions in per capita consumption lowered eco-
nomic welfare immediately, while large cuts in investment threatened the
potential for future growth.",2 6
UNICEF spelled out the costs of the debt crisis in more human
terms. It argued that the net loss of resources to the Third World re-
sulted in the deaths of over 650,000 children in 1988 alone.2"
In the 1980s, as the costs to development and welfare escalated,
Third World resistance to debt charges grew. In response, lenders
21. Calculated from id. at 258-59, table 19.
22. Id. at 29.
23. Calculated from TABLES, supra note 2, at 4.
24. REPORT 1988, supra note 7, at 258, table 19.
25. Id. at 30.
26. Id.
27. UNICEFDeplores Debt Crisis Toll on Children, L.A. Times, Dec. 20, 1988, at 24, col.
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granted greater financial concessions in exchange for assurances of pay-
ment, and induced their own governments to expand lending to the
debtor countries. They responded most generously to the very large
debtors, whose refusal to meet interest or repayment schedules could se-
riously damage the profitability of the transnational banks. At the same
time, they continued to make adoption of austerity measures a precondi-
tion for financial relief.
Beginning in the late 1970s, private creditors rescheduled the debts
of a growing number of Third World countries. Each year between 1985
and 1988, they granted around ten countries eighty billion dollars relief
on debt.2" Initially, creditors agreed to delay payments only in return for
higher interest rates. But in the late 1980s, larger debtors, most notably
Brazil and Mexico, began to win longer grace periods and maturities
without significant increases in interest payments.29 Between 1983 and
1988, for the average rescheduled loan, maturity rose from six to eight-
een years, the grace period climbed from three to eight years, and the
interest rate declined from two percent over the London Interbank Bor-
rowing Rate (Libor) to under one percent.30 As a result of these arrange-
ments, the World Bank estimated that in 1985 even private lenders
suffered an opportunity cost on Third World loans compared to normal
commercial rates. For the following two years, it estimated the cost at
just over ten percent of all new commitments.31
In the 1980s, for the Third World as a whole, net long-term borrow-
ing from official lenders remains at around thirty billion dollars a year.32
Since private lending fell in the same period, its share in total Third
World debt declined from a peak in 1984 of fifty-eight percent to fifty-one
percent in 1987. 33 Until 1989, at least, official lending grew relatively
rapidly for both groups of countries considered particularly troubled by
debt. In the heavily-indebted middle-income countries, it climbed from
five billion dollars a year in 1980 to 1982 to twelve billion dollars a year
in 1983 to 1987, before slipping back to under eight billion dollars annu-
28. Calculated from TABLES, supra note 2, at xlvi, table III-4.
29. By 1987, the highly indebted middle-income countries had won greater concessions
from the private banks than the low-income states in sub-Saharan Africa. Compare figures on
the grant element in private loans from id. at 31, 35.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 3. The World Bank refers to this opportunity cost as the "grant element" of
these loans, which it calculates by discounting the nominal value of the contracted debt service
at 10 percent a year, and subtracting the result from the nominal value of the loan. See Id. at
lxiii.
32. IMF, Oct. 1988, supra note 6, at 108, table A40.
33. Calculated from TABLES, supra note 2, at 2.
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ally for the next two years. As a result, the share of private debt in the
group's total long-term external liabilities. fell from eighty percent in
1984 to seventy percent five years later. In sub-Saharan Africa outside
Nigeria and South Africa, long-term foreign funding rose from four bil-
lion dollars in the early 1980s to six billion dollars by the end of the
decade; the share of private lending in external liabilities shrank from
thirty percent to twenty percent.34
In sum, the debt crisis presented qualitatively different problems to
the transnational banks and Third World countries, leading them to di-
verge in evaluating the extent of the crisis, its causes, and potential solu-
tions. In effect, borrowers and lenders negotiated endlessly over what
amount of debt each party would repay.
The aggregate figures used here for Third World debt obscure a key
factor in those negotiations: the costs of debt repayment, not to individ-
ual Third World economies as a whole, but to specific social groups. In
most heavily indebted countries, the allocation of domestic costs signifi-
cantly influenced domestic politics. In this context, the austerity pro-
grams endorsed by the Western banks and their governments worked to
support those who sought to place a disproportionate share of the repay-
ment burden on the poor. 5
I. THE AUSTERITY PROGRAMS: LOGIC
AND SHORTCOMINGS 36
Private lenders and foreign governments avoided elaborating their
own domestic policy proposals for Third World governments faced with
pressing debt problems. Instead, before providing further funds or
rescheduling existing loans, they have typically insisted that such states
agree with the IMF on longer-term measures to overcome the debt prob-
34. Calculated from IMF, Oct. 1988, supra note 6, at 115, table A42, 126, table A48.
35. As this perception of austerity programs has become more widespread in recent years,
IMF and IBRD experts have conducted more research into the impact of their policies on the
poor. See Heller, Fund-Supported Adjustment Programs and the Poor, 25 FINANCE AND DEa.
2-6 (1988). Unfortunately, much of the research seems flawed. For instance, Heller notes the
potential deficiencies of programs in a number of countries in this regard, but ultimately dis-
misses them by assuming the programs will ultimately lead to greater growth and, therefore,
benefit everyone. As discussed infra, this assumption rests on a weak analytical basis.
36. See also Makgetla, Theoretical and Practical Implications of IMF Conditionality in
Zambia, 24 J. MODERN AFR. STUD. 395-422 (1986); Makgetla, Development Strategies in the
Third World- An Application to South Africa, in CONFLICT AND CONTINUITY IN AFRICA (L
Masur ed. forthcoming); Makgetla & Seidman, The Applicability of Law and Economics to the
Third World, 23 J. ECONOMIC IssuEs 35 (1989). For an alternative analysis that comes to
similar conclusions, see N. Girvan, Swallowing the IMF Medicine in the Seventies, 2 DEV.
DIALoGUE 55-74 (1980); J. LOXLEY, supra note 4, at 44.
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lem.a7 In effect, they endorsed the theoretical and practical position
adopted by the Fund. Therefore, IMF and World Bank documents best
articulate the analysis that most official and private lenders effectively
proposed for the Third World.
The supply-side theory38 that underpins the austerity programs can
be understood as pointing to a specific social problem, indicating its
causes, and proposing solutions on that basis. The theory originated to
explain stagflation in the United States - the coexistence of inflation and
low productivity. At the macroeconomic level, it blames stagflation on
excessive demand in the face of stagnant productivity. Third World debt
fits neatly into this paradigm, as another case where domestic output
cannot meet domestic requirements.39 In supply-side theory, the imme-
diate causes of this disequilibrium become excessive government spend-
ing and wages, both of which raise consumption at the cost of productive
investment. At the microeconomic level, adherents hold, these ills result
from excessive government intervention, which prevents inherently effi-
cient markets from generating higher productivity. The logical solution
becomes a reduction in government allocation of resources - that is,
greater reliance on the free market. In this context, "[lower living stan-
dards are unavoidable when the previous level has been artificially raised
by unsustainable policies."'  The theory employs the elegantly abstract
logic of neo-classical economics, which permits it to claim to apply
equally well to all economies, irrespective of specific institutional or pro-
duction structures.
A detailed investigation of the macro and micro aspects of this argu-
ment and its methodology suggests its weaknesses in the Third World
context. On the macro level, the use of national aggregates conceals ma-
37. See, e.g., Gwin, The IMF and the World Bank: Measure" to Improve the System, in
UNCERTAIN FUTURE: COMMERCIAL BANKS AND THE THIRD WORLD 95 (R. Feinberg & V.
Kallab, eds. Overseas Development Council 1984) [hereinafter UNCERTAIN FUTURE].
38. Historically, the IMF adopted a monetarist position. See J.'LOXLEY, supra note 4, at
27. Following the advent of the Reagan Administration, however, a focus on supply-side eco.
nomics merged easily with the earlier monetarist positions, as examination of the World
Bank's annual World Development Report and the IMF's periodic World Economic Outlook
during the 1980s demonstrates. By the late 1980s, the terminology of the law and economics
movement had begun to insinuate itself into IMF and World Bank documents; see for In.
stance, the focus on transaction costs in IBRD, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1987, at 59
(1987) [hereinafter REPORT 1987]; and on appropriate allocation of property rights to combat
pollution, in REPORT 1988, supra note 7, at 53.
39. See, eg., IMF, Oct. 1988, supra note 6, at 36-37. Generally, the World Bank deflnes
the goals of development as "economic efficiency, growth, macroeconomic stability and pov-
erty alleviation." REPORT 1988, supra note 7, at 49 (repeated verbatim at 52). The stress on
efficiency reflects the typical supply-side stance.
40. REPORT 1988, supra note 7, at 60.
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jor differences between social groups and economic sectors. Conse-
quently, the use of these aggregates to guide policy has unforeseen and
undesirable repercussions. The microeconomic argument assumes that
Third World economies approach the perfectly competitive ideal - an
assumption that even a cursory inspection refutes. Moreover, the reli-
ance on abstract logic as the principle test of theory distracts policy mak-
ers from assessing the value of the general analysis in each country's
particular circumstances. Rather than encouraging research to find ap-
propriate policy solutions, the IMF and World Bank assure us that, de-
spite some modifications in application, their theory can adequately
address economic problems in all countries.
A. The Use of Aggregate Concepts in the Third World
The concepts of aggregate demand and national income, as used in
macroeconomics since Keynes, imply that policy makers can realistically
deal with the economy as a unified whole.4" Supply-side theory accepts
that methodological tenet. It merely reverses the Keynesian paradigm,
arguing that in a typical moderh economy, the most common problem is
stagflation, not unemployment alone; and the cause is excessive, not in-
adequate, demand. The austerity programs then demand a slowdown in
demand and consumption,42 in order to release resources to fuel produc-
tive investment,43 as well as to meet debt-service charges.
The use of national aggregates seems defensible in the fairly homog-
enous economies of the industrialized capitalist countries, which Keynes
studied. In these conditions, while treating the entire society as a unified
whole might have unforeseen effects on marginal groups, it may generate
useful insights for policy. Under the Third World, however, modem
scholars subsume precisely those economies in which enormous gaps sep-
arate income groups and economic sectors. In these circumstances, an
undifferentiated analysis generates simplistic and thus ineffective policy
solutions. To illustrate, consider the implications of redefining the
Keynesian aggregates in ways appropriate to Third World economies.
1. Differentiating Income Groups and Capital Outflow
In contrast to the industrialized countries, in most of the Third
World the middle class remains comparatively small. Most people fall
41. See J.M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND
MONEY 25 (1964).
42. For mechanisms to achieve this end, see infra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
43. See, eg., IMF, Oct. 1988, supra note 6, at 36-7.
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into one of the two dominant income groups: the rich and the poor.
Although scant and often old, the available information suggests that in
most Third World countries the top ten percent of income earners enjoys
between one-third and two-fifths of national income. This small upper-
income group receives a much larger share than the poorest sixty percent
- essentially, the peasantry and urban poor, including most wage earn-
ers - taken together. By contrast, in the industrialized capitalist na-
tions, the top ten percent receives about a one-quarter of national
income; the lowest sixty percent, something over one-third."
Since the overall productivity of the Third World remains far below
that of the industrialized countries, massive income disparities spell
grinding poverty for the majority of the population. The implications
emerge from statistics on life expectancy and infant mortality. In the
mid-1980s, a person born in the Third World was ten times more likely
to die during his or her first year than someone born in the industrialized
capitalist countries, and could expect to live twenty years less. In coun-
tries that displayed particularly great inequality, such as South Africa,
even with fairly high productivity, infant mortality was well above the
average for the Third World and life expectancy was even shorter.41
In short, in the Third World the poor majority lives near the mini-
mum level of subsistence, spending at least half its income on food alone.
In these circumstances, it seems inappropriate to treat national consump-
tion as homogenous. Rather, it makes more sense to explain low invest-
ment as due to excessive consumption by the rich minority.
Furthermore, a considerable share of the national income of the
heavily indebted countries finances neither domestic consumption nor
production, but goes for debt-service payments. In 1986, these payments
averaged over three percent of the national income for the low-income
countries, excluding India and China, and almost six percent for lower
middle-income nations.4
These data suggest that low investment results from the capital out-
flow and excessive consumption by the wealthy. This approach requires
a rewriting of the fundamental supply-side equation. With standard
Keynesian logic, it holds that: S = Y - C, where S = savings, Y =
national income and C = consumption. In that case, savings can be
increased only by cutting consumption. A form more appropriate for the
Third World might suggest, instead, that: S = Y .- (Ch + C + K"),
44. Calculated from REPORT 1988, supra note 7, at 273, table 26.
45. Calculated from id. at 287-88, table 33.
46. Id. at 258, table 19.
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where Ch = consumption by the high-income group, C = consumption
by the low-income group, and K. = the outflow of capital for debt
service.
The different formulation has important policy implications. The
original aggregation explains low investment as the consequence of exces-
sive consumption by everyone in society. Policy makers need not design
measures to affect particular income groups. In these circumstances, the
high-income group can easily use its political and economic clout to en-
sure that measures to cut consumption have, at best, a proportional im-
pact. By contrast, separating out consumption by income level compels
policy makers to determine which social group enjoys excessive con-
sumption at the cost of investment. In effect, it incorporates the need to
take income inequalities into account when cutting consumption. The
rich minority could afford a significant decline in income without suffer-
ing undue hardship; cutting the same percentage from the consumption
of the poor majority could cause starvation - as attempts to implement
austerity measures in a number of Third World countries have shown.47
Similarly, incorporating the capital outflow separately indicates that it,
too, contributes to depressed investment.
2. Differentiation by Investment Structure
The income disparities of the Third World generate a peculiar struc-
ture of production. A disproportionate share of domestic output satisfies
the demand of the small high-income group for relatively sophisticated
consumer goods. Given the comparatively low level of technological in-
frastructure in most Third World countries, most of these production
processes depend on imported equipment, and frequently on continuous
imports of components and materials as well. As a result, their multi-
plier effect takes place largely abroad. Moreover, the goods produced do
little to raise living standards or productivity among the poor majority,
providing neither cheap consumer necessities nor appropriate tools and
materials.
In these circumstances, it seems inappropriate to concentrate policy
measures on low aggregate investment. Rather, Third World countries
suffer from excessive investment in the production of luxuries, and inade-
quate investment to provide consumer and producer necessities.
Again, this refinement of the supply-side hypothesis emerges from a
reformulation of the relevant equation to hold that: S. = Y - (C + S),
47. See, eg., Cohen, High Finance, High Politics, in UNCERTAIN FUTURE, supra note 37,
at 116-17.
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where S, = investment in luxuries, and Sn = investment in necessities.
The reformulated equation explains inadequate investment in necessities
as the consequence, not only of high consumption, but also of excessive
investment in inappropriate industries. It suggests that rather than seek-
ing to expand all investment equally, policy makers should focus on in-
vestments that meet the needs of the poor majority.
3. Differentiation According to Socioeconomic Sector
A pervasive dualism distinguishes Third World economies from the
industrialized economies. This dualism appears in the patent differences
between a so-called modem sector and a peripheral sector, whose relative
size and composition vary tremendously from country to country.
Rather than explaining stagflation in these conditions through a para-
digm developed for the industrialized countries, a more appropriate ex-
planation would take the dualism of Third World economies into
account. This approach points to the need for separate consideration of
the Keynesian aggregates in each sector.
Every Third World economy includes some modern enterprises in
industry, agriculture, and finance. Generally, compared to the industri-
alized economies, these activities remain heavily dependent on interna-
tional trade. Many such enterprises originated with export-oriented
activities initiated during or soon after the colonial era, and continue to
focus on foreign markets. From the 1950s on, import-substituting manu-
facturing industries emerged. Most produce luxuries and semi-luxuries,
while a fairly small number supply consumer goods for the mass market,
such as beer, cigarettes, simple processed foods, and textiles. Even in
relatively advanced Third World economies, most modern sector indus-
tries rely on imported technologies and inputs in order to compete in
export and luxury markets. Their comparatively well-paid owners and
managers use the bulk of the consumer goods imported. The limited do-
mestic linkages of the modem sector ensure that even when it enjoys an
investment boom, it exerts only a relatively weak multiplier effect on the
local economy.
The peripheral sector comprises relatively small-scale enterprises
and uses primarily local technology and inputs to meet the needs of the
low-income group. It includes most rural peasants and urban producers.
They produce fairly unsophisticated goods (e.g., foodstuffs, household
utensils, simple tools, construction, and clothing) for the domestic mar-
ket. Most use virtually no foreign equipment or inputs. By international
standards, their productivity proves low but their extensive domestic
linkages make them a potential stimulus for broader economic activity.
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Given this dualist socio-economic structure, the argument that ex-
cessive aggregate demand causes balance-of-payments deficits and conse-
quently foreign debt seems oversimplified. The modem sector generates
excessive demand, which perhaps explains its persistent inflation and ex-
cessive dependence on imports of inputs and relatively luxurious con-
sumer goods. But enterprises in the peripheral sector frequently find
expansion difficult due to a lack of demand for their goods and services.
This analysis suggests a reformulation of the supply-side equation:
AD > Y, where AD = aggregate demand and Y = national income.
Instead, one can argue: ADm > Ym and ADp < Yp, where the subscript
m = modem sector and the subscript p = peripheral sector. The former
equation explains inflation and the balance-of-payments deficit as due to
excessive demand in the modem sector. The latter equation blames high
levels of underemployment of labor and other resources on the inade-
quate demand facing the peripheral sector.
Again, the reformulation of supply-side equations leads to new pol-
icy solutions. Rather than seeking to depress demand in general, it sug-
gests that policy makers should attempt to reduce demand for imports,
while stimulating demand for goods produced using local inputs. The
consequent development of local linkages would effectively enhance the
national multiplier effect, ensuring that investments increase both pro-
ductivity and employment disproportionately.
B. The Nature of Markets in the Third World
To explain excessive demand and consumption relative to the na-
tional income, supply-side theory turns to microeconomics. In this view,
from the late 1970s, "[s]low growth, lagging private savings and invest-
ment, high inflation, balance of payments deficits, heavy debt burdens,
continued poverty, and unemployment began to be seen, at least in part,
as the result of the excessive growth of the public sector." '48 Supply-side
adherents conclude that governments should intervene only where mar-
kets prove demonstrably inefficient or where "poverty problems are espe-
cially severe."' 9 In particular, "in agriculture, industry, energy, mining
and many services - although some support may be needed - govem-
ments are generally not well equipped to play a major role."'  In the
Third World, the World Bank lists as "obstacles to longer term growth"
a variety of government efforts to influence the market, including "distor-
48. REPORT 1988, supra note 7, at 49.
49. Id. at 52.
50. Id.
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tions in the incentives for production (e.g., overvalued real exchange
rates); controls on prices, interest rates and credit; burdensome tariffs
and import restrictions; and excessive taxes and subsidies."'"
For the IMF and World Bank, four forms of government interven-
tion prove particularly detrimental. First, they maintain that large
budget deficits divert resources from the productive private sector to the
comparatively unproductive public sector. When governments use re-
sources to fund social services and high civil-service employment levels,
they leave the private sector with less to invest in production. In this
vein, the World Bank argues that budget deficits formed "a principal
cause of the international debt crisis," encouraging both public borrow-
ing and the flight of private-sector capital. 2 Second, foreign-exchange
and trade controls discourage the emergence of efficient export and im-
port activities. In effect, these controls subsidize some imports while
they tax exports. This prevents the market from allocating resources to
the most profitable sectors, which, according to supply-side adherents,
must be the most efficient sectors. Third, price controls on basic food-
stuffs, designed to hold down the cost of living for urban dwellers, effec-
tively impose further taxes on peasant producers. Moreover, they lead to
shortages, because the fixed price fuels demand while discouraging sup-
ply. As a consequence, bureaucratic rationing systems take over. Fi-
nally, government investment directs resources precisely into activities
the private sector finds unprofitable.
These arguments guided the IMF agenda for maintaining growth
and debt-service payments in the Third World. It argued that indebted
governments should
... aim at reducing the distortions in relative prices that still impede
resource allocation in many developing countries. Of particular im-
portance are distortions such as interest rate controls and overvalued
exchange rates which serve to discourage saving and lead to invest-
ments being channeled into inefficient areas, or to capital flight. It is
also important for countries to open up their economies to efficiency-
promoting foreign competition, to reduce subsidies to industries in
which they no longer have a comparative advantage, and to tackle ef-
fectively the widespread distortions that often discriminate against the
agricultural sector.53
In neo-classical economics, the argument that the market will en-
sure efficiency derives from the use of the model of perfect competition,
51. Id. at 59.
52. Id. at 64; see also id. at 58-59, box 3-2, 59-60.
53. IMF, April 1988, supra note 2, at 32.
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absent externalities.5 4 If real-world markets diverge greatly from those
conditions, the efficiency of market as opposed to administrative alloca-
tion of resources falls into doubt. The World Bank acknowledges that
such "market failures" may occur, but apparently views them as rare.55
That assumption places the burden of proof on the advocates of state
intervention, making the free market the desirable norm.
Major Third World markets, however, do not come close to the con-
ditions of perfect competition. Above all, on both domestic and external
markets, they display massive income inequalities associated with a great
concentration of economic power. Furthermore, they suffer from serious
factor immobilities and informational deficiencies. In these circum-
stances, it seems useful to hypothesize that most free markets Will prove
inefficient.
1. Income Inequalities and Market Power
The model of perfect competition requires a great number of small
companies, which in itself rules out major income disparities. More im-
portant, income equality also represents a condition for the market to
achieve efficiency from a social standpoint, rather than solely in terms of
returns on factors.56 The market achieves efficiency by ensuring mini-
mum-cost production to meet demand. From a social point of view, that
represents efficiency only if market demand adequately reflects the needs
of the majority - which can occur only when incomes are fairly equal.
In the Third World, however, massive income inequalities persist. In
that case, letting the market determine the structure of output may en-
sure, not production to meet the basic needs of the majority, but a supply
of luxuries for the high-income minority, as well as an export bias in the
modem sector.
Furthermore, in conditions of perfect competition, firms can exer-
cise no control over prices because prices reflect market supply and de-
mand. To raise their profit rate above the average, then, managers can
only seek to cut costs. If firms can raise their prices by manipulating
their output, however, they may avoid the market compulsion to mini-
mize costs. That scenario describes the situation in most of the Third
54. This methodology goes back to Adam Smith, who also started by discussing how
markets could foster efficiency, and only then detailed the circumstances under which that
would not occur. See A. SMITH, THE ESSENTIAL ADAM SMITH 192-93 (R. Heilbroner ed.
1986).
55. REPORT 1988, supra note 7, at 51.
56. See G. MEIER, EMERGING FROM POVERTY: THE ECONOMIcS THAT REALLY MAT-
TERS 221 (1984).
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World. In each country, a handful of large, often foreign firms domi-
nates most industries in the modem sector. Concentration follows
largely from simple economic realities: in many Third World countries,
demand remains very small relative to modem economies of scale. In
1986 in sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, outside Nigeria and South Af-
rica the average population was roughly fifteen million; the average per
capita income, roughly under five hundred dollars." Economies of that
size cannot possibly sustain competitive enterprises using fairly modern
technologies in such industries as automobile, petroleum or even textiles
production. In the more industrialized Third World economies, more-
over, conglomerates frequently control a significant share of several sec-
tors, furthering concentration.
Third World countries also face highly imperfect markets in the in-
ternational arena. Compared to the industrialized countries, most Third
World countries export and import a limited range of commodities,
which they sell to or through a few transnational corporations. The con-
centration of international markets appears in the financial sector, where
some twenty transnational banks controlled over half of Euromarket
loans in the early 1980s.18 In most raw-material markets, a similar de-
gree of economic concentration emerged, often regulated by a marketing
agreement5 9
In the absence of fairly equal income distribution and competition,
the assumption that either domestic or foreign markets will enforce cost-
cutting measures on profit maximizers seems likely to generate unrealis-
tic analyses. In that case, to provide a more reliable analytical basis for
policy solutions, research should seek to find the specific causes of ineffi-
ciency in both the private and public sector, rather than blaming govern-
ment intervention in general.
2. Factor Immobilities and Information Deficiencies
In perfectly competitive markets, resources flow to their most profit-
able and efficient uses like water seeking its own level. That happy result
emerges for two reasons. On the one hand, in perfect competition all
enterprises necessarily know their most profitable options in advance.
On the other, the model requires that all resources are perfectly mobile;
that is, the transfer of resources from one production process to another
57. Calculated from REPORT 1988, supra note 7, at 222, table 1.
58. J. LOXLEY, supra note 4, at 68.
59., Such examples include the London Metal Exchange syster; the De Beers conglomer-
ate in diamonds; the "seven sisters" in petroleum; or the quota agreements that apply to
agricultural raw materials, including sugar and coffee.
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involves no cost in terms of time or money. In circumstances that ap-
proach these conditions, nothing prevents enterprises from finding or
moving into the most efficient possible activities. If the relative profit-
ability of different activities changes, producers can transfer resources to
the most profitable opportunities with no period of unemployment. In
particular, if the price of a good rises, as long as costs remain unchanged
the employment of resources and ultimately output in that sector will
increase. In other words, the conditions of factor mobility and perfect
information guarantee fairly elastic supply.
In most Third World markets, however, these conditions do not ex-
ist. First, enterprises rarely know about potential investment opportuni-
ties. Most people have relatively low levels of education, and are shut off
from sources of economic information. In the peripheral sector, the
weakness of statistical agencies, financial institutions and market rela-
tionships themselves mitigate against the spread of information. Both
the modem and peripheral sectors suffer from unpredictable price swings
that result from the lack of competition on international markets. Sec-
ond, the weakness of the local capital-goods industry and the lack of
technological skills and research stunt the domestic technological infra-
structure. In consequence, the transfer of resources between sectors
proves expensive. As a rule, entrepreneurs cannot simply embark on in-
novative lines of production in response to price changes, but must invest
considerable sums of money in new, often imported, machinery and
equipment and in training.
In these circumstances, changes in relative price may cause durable
economic stagnation, as producers cut down on production as it becomes
less profitable without finding more attractive opportunities in other sec-
tors. Devaluation, for instance, increases the price of imports, which
bankrupts many import-dependent producers and raises the cost of liv-
ing. It may not, however, stimulate major investment in the production
of import substitutes and exports, as potential entrepreneurs have neither
the funds nor the knowledge to develop new lines of production. Simi-
larly, raising the price of a good alone may not ensure significantly in-
creased supply. In Zambia, for instance, in an effort to raise output of
the staple food, maize, policy makers quadrupled its price. The policy
led to widespread hardship among the low-income majority. Yet re-
search found no historical correlation between changes in real or nominal
price and the output of maize.'
60. See J. Hasan, Agricultural Development and Pricing Policy (1986), M.A. Thesis, Uni-
versity of Zambia, Lusaka (Mar. 1986) (available at Dept. of Business and Economic Studies,
Univ. of Zambia).
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The lack of factor mobility and perfect information in Third World
markets suggests the implausibility of the expectation that permitting the
free market to change relative prices will ensure efficiency. Instead, pol-
icy makers should explore the full range of institutional and economic
hindrances to the emergence of a desirable production structure. By co-
ordinating marketing, training, financial support, and other inputs, they
may achieve an appropriate growth pattern at a far lower cost in terms of
unemployment and stagnation.
C. The Use of General Theory in the Third World
The IMF and the World Bank essentially rely on the methodology
of neo-classical economics. In that approach, adherents develop models
that describe market economies in general. As a rule, rather than test the
relevance of the implied causal analysis to a particular situation, they
merely seek to find specific instances of the predicated causes. In the
same mode, the IMF and World Bank tend toward the assumption that
most markets prove efficient; governments need intervene only to prevent
market failures. They then investigate instances where government inter-
vention and inefficiency coincide. In the process, they neglect other fac-
tors that might cause inefficiency. They substantiate their generalizations
by compiling statistics on many countries. 6'
This approach to policy making implies that general theories can
apply unmodified in all, or at least most of the Third World. Yet no
general theory of economics initially arose to explain the Third World
circumstance. Moreover, Third World countries cannot afford major
policy mistakes. In these circumstances, the failure to present theory as a
source of testable hypotheses, rather than economic laws, proves particu-
larly dangerous.62
IV. CONCLUSION
In response to rising Third World debt and the associated increase
in cases of near-default and rescheduling, the transnational banks have
looked to austerity programs to ensure that borrowers meet debt-service
payments. Yet the austerity programs rely on a faulty theoretical basis
that essentially assumes away the peculiarities of Third World econo-
mies. Rather than develop strategies to meet the special needs of the
developing world, the IMF and World Bank have effectively sought to
impose policies that predicate an industrialized market economy. Not
61. See, e-g., REPORT 1988, supra note 7, at 52; REPORT 1987, supra note 38, at 85.
62. For a more detailed analysis, see Makgetla & Seidman, supra note 36.
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surprisingly, instead of stimulating growth, in most cases they have led to
a prolonged recession.
In the name of economic exigency, the austerity programs seek to
place the burden of debt repayment, not on the Third World's high-in-
come groups or on foreign creditors, but on the rural and urban poor.
Although the transnational banks and their governments granted in-
creasing financial concessions in the late 1980s, they still demanded the
imposition of austerity measures as a precondition. That strategy ap-
peared particularly attractive to the United States Government,6 3 multi-
lateral organizations, and foreign banks, none of which suffered directly
from the political and social consequences. For the majority in the Third
World, however, even where austerity programs coincided with some
economic growth, the costs in terms of both welfare and overall develop-
ment proved enormous. As a result, the programs frequently generated
widespread popular unrest, and could continue only under authoritarian
governments prepared to ignore the will of the majority. Even then, in
the longer run domestic resistance typically doomed austerity policies -
and with them, most attempts to meet debt-service charges. In these cir-
cumstances, the determination of foreign creditors to adhere to the aus-
terity approach seemed, at best, ideologically motivated and short-
sighted.
63. See Cohen, supra note 47, at 117-18. A plan proposed by the United States Secretary
of the Treasury, Nicholas Brady, in March 1989 would make significant financial concessions
contingent on the adoption of austerity measures. See A. Pine, Treasury Chief Offers Plan to
Ease Third World Debt, L. A. Times, March 11, 1989, part I, at I, and Brady Debt Plan Faces
Challenges at Cabinet Level, L.A. Times, March 14, 1989, part IV, at 1.
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